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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Before The Honorable William H. Orrick, Judge
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Wednesday, June 15, 2016 2:07 p.m.
P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
--oOo--
          THE CLERK:  Calling civil matter 16-00213, Fields
versus Twitter, Incorporated.
Counsel, please come forward and state your appearance.
MR. ARISOHN:  Good afternoon, your Honor.  Joseph
Arisohn of Bursor and Fisher on behalf of the plaintiffs.
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
MR. WAXMAN:  Hi, I'm Seth Waxman from Wilmer Hale
on behalf of the defendant.
THE COURT:  Good afternoon.
All right.  Let me tell you what I think about this
motion to help you focus your argument.  I'm inclined to
grant the motion to dismiss.
So as I get it, plaintiff's theory is that Twitter's
provision of accounts, not the way that ISIS used them, is
what provided the material support to ISIS.  But the
allegation -- the way that the complaint is framed, first of
all, all the allegations seem content based, to me, and that
the essence of the complaint seems to be that Twitter
permits ISIS to spread its propaganda, raise funds and
attract new recruits.  It's all content based.
So the first problem is the link.
The second problem is that the material support theory
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I think requires ISIS to use rather than just open accounts,
and that makes the Communications Decency Act section
230(c)(1) applicable.
Then finally, I just don't see any causation under the
Anti-Terrorism Act, even using the substantial factor test. 
There's no allegation that ISIS recruited Zaid over Twitter,
used Twitter to plan the attack or that Zaid ever viewed
Twitter or had a Twitter account.
And even if there were those allegations, then you'd
still sort of circle back to the content based problem, I
think, with 230(c)(1).  And then with respect to direct
messaging, just because it's private messaging I think
doesn't put this beyond the Communications Decency Act's
reach.
So that's the -- those are the serious problems that I
see with the complaint.  So go ahead and explain the error
of my ways.
MR. ARISOHN:  I'm happy to address all of those
points, your Honor.
First, in terms of the application of the CDA, that
depends in large part on the claims actually being asserted,
as you noted.  So if we just take a step back and talk about
what those are here.
And for the most part, you got it right.  For years,
defendant has knowingly provided ISIS with material support
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in the form of Twitter accounts, and it did that despite
knowing that ISIS was a designated terrorist group and
despite knowing that ISIS used those accounts for raising
funds and recruiting new members and spreading propaganda.
And the Anti-Terrorism Act, the ATA, prohibits
providing precisely that kind of material support, because
these kinds of fungible resources can be used to facilitate
numerous terrorist attacks around the world and against
American citizens in particular.
And that's what happened here.  ISIS in large part due
to the material -- to the enormous social media following
that it was able to build on Twitter was able to grow into
one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organizations in
the world.  And it's carried out thousands of the most
gruesome terrorist attacks that have ever been documented. 
And one of those attacks was on November 9, 2015 at the
International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan in
which Mr. Creach and Mr. Fields were killed, leaving their
wives behind and leaving Mr. Creach's boys fatherless.
Now, the defendant argues that despite our allegation
that they provided this material support to a designated
terrorist organization, they should be protected by the
Communications Decency Act, the CDA.  But the limited
purpose of the CDA is to protect interactive computer
services from being held liable as a publisher or speaker of
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offensive content.  And as the Ninth Circuit has explained,
that means -- publishing activity for purposes of the CDA
means reviewing content or editing or deciding whether to
issue or to withdraw content.
And here, plaintiff's allegations are not based on any
of these activities.  Plaintiffs don't seek to hold
defendant responsible for the tweets of ISIS, and plaintiffs
don't seek to hold defendant liable because of the way that
it reviewed or edited ISIS's tweets or because it issued
tweets or refused to withdraw tweets.
Rather, plaintiffs seek to hold defendant responsible
for knowingly permitting ISIS to sign up for those accounts
in the first place and -- 
THE COURT:  And then you seek -- I mean every time
you mention the accounts, you link them to the content,
necessarily I think, because the problem is the horrific
stuff that ISIS was doing.  But that's a very different
problem than opening up accounts.  
And the idea of a company that opens millions of
accounts being held as a terrorist organization because it's
providing material support in having a few of those accounts
being used by people -- it would be great if they weren't
using them, but that's a different problem, it seems to me.
MR. ARISOHN:  The complaint does refer to the
content of tweets, and I'll tell you why, because there is a
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difference -- and under Ninth Circuit precedent, there's a
difference between the violation itself and the causal
chain.  And whether the CDA applies depends on the violation
itself.
And if you provide material support to a terrorist
organization in the form of a Twitter account, that by
itself, before any tweet is even issued, is a violation of
the criminal law -- the criminal section of the Anti-
Terrorism Act and it thus gives rise to the private right of
action.
Now, the Ninth Circuit has now held twice that the CDA
does not bar a claim simply because publishing activity is
part of the causal analysis.  And to the extent that the
complaint contains content, it's because of it's related to
causation.  And so just two weeks ago, in the Internet
Brands case which is brought to the Court's attention, the
court in that case noted that there was no causal link
without considering the profile of the plaintiff which had
been posted and which led to her rape.
The court noted that publishing activity is the cause
of just about everything that an internet publishing company
does, and that doesn't mean it's immunized from all
liability.  And the Ninth Circuit in Internet Brands for
that proposition cited to the Barnes case, also a Ninth
Circuit case from a few years earlier which stated that the
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 40   Filed 06/23/16   Page 6 of 28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
7
               Echo Reporting, Inc.
failure to remove the profile in that case, even -- that was
content and it was the but-for cause of injury in that case. 
But that didn't mean that the CDA immunized Yahoo from all
liability.  
And in -- 
THE COURT:  Don't you see a distinction?  Barnes
was a promissory estoppel case.  The Internet Brands case is
a failure to warn case.  Don't you see a difference between
those cases and yours?
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, I actually think the Internet
Brands case is very on point.  In that case, there was the
failure to warn case.  And the duty to warn arose when the
defendant became aware, obtained knowledge that these people
were using its website as a rape scheme.  
And similarly here, Twitter, once it learned that ISIS
was using its accounts for spreading propaganda -- and it
learns that through extraneous sources, not through its
publishing activities -- at that point it had a duty under
the Anti-Terrorism Act to not let them sign up for accounts,
or at least try to stop them.
And so I think it's very similar to the Internet Brands
case on that point.  And the Ninth Circuit repeated several
times how important it was that the duty was based on
Internet Brands' knowledge and knowledge that it acquired
from outside of its publishing activities.
Case 3:16-cv-00213-WHO   Document 40   Filed 06/23/16   Page 7 of 28
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
8
               Echo Reporting, Inc.
And I think it's really hard to distinguish that here,
because that's exactly what we alleged in the complaint.
THE COURT:  All right.  And do you want to say
anything with respect to the direct messaging argument?
MR. ARISOHN:  Yeah, I'd like to talk about the
direct messaging and then move on to other the proximate
causation issue that --
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. ARISOHN:  I think on the direct messaging
issue, it's an even clearer case that the CDA should not
apply, because these are private communications.  And let me
explain.  The CDA does not define the term "publisher."  It
says you can hold defendant liable as a publisher, but it
doesn't say what that means. 
And as you know, when a term is used in the statute and
not otherwise defined, it's to be given its ordinary
meaning.  That's a basic canon of statutory interpretation
that we all learned in our first year of law school
presumably.
And no matter what dictionary you look in, the common
definition of "publisher" is one who disseminates
information to the public.  And if Congress wanted to use a
broader definition of "publisher," it could have put that in
the statute.  There are plenty of statutes that include
definitional sections.
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THE COURT:  But didn't the Ninth Circuit tell us
in Barnes that we're to look at the defamation case law
where a publication would just be one person to another
talking something that's bad about the third person?
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, the issue in Barnes is really
about whether there's any difference between a distributor
or publisher when claims are actually based on content.  It
didn't actually say clearly that you're supposed to always
apply this defamation definition of "publisher" in all
instances.
And to the extent that that broader definition should
ever be applied, it really only makes sense in the context
of defamation cases.  I don't think it makes sense to take
this broad definition from defamation law and to apply it to
completely separate areas of the law like the Anti-Terrorism
Act that have nothing to do with defamation.  And at least
one court has agreed with that theory.  
And the FTC -- the Accusearch case which we cite in our
opposition brief, there the defendant was selling private
customer information, presumably to just single individuals. 
And they said that they should be immune under the CDA
because even though they were selling it just in one-off
instances, the defamation definition should apply.
And the court wasn't really having any of it.  They
said:  But the FTCs do not sound in defamation.  And if they
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did, we'd be happy to apply that definition.  But it's a
strained interpretation of the CDA to apply that definition
to a claim brought under the FTC Act.  
And likewise here, it's a strained interpretation to
apply that definition to a claim under the Anti-Terrorism
Act.  It just doesn't make sense.
THE COURT:  Okay.  I disagree with you, but go
ahead.
MR. ARISOHN:  In terms of -- 
THE COURT:  Causation?
MR. ARISOHN:  -- proximate causation -- so first
of all, it should be pointed out that there's no but-for
causation requirement under the ATA.  And for the proximate
causation requirement, there's no requirement that you show
directness.
Now, the defendant pointed to this by-reason-of
language which has been interpreted in other contexts, this
requiring directness, but court after court to address that
issue in the context of the ATA, has rejected that reasoning
for two reasons.
The first is that proving directness in a terrorism
case would be impossible and would make the ATA practically
a dead letter.  That's how the court in Strauss v. Credit
Lyonnais put it.
And that's undoubtedly true.  Unless you happen to have
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some sort of inside information about the inner workings of
the financials of these terrorist organizations, you're
almost certainly not going to be able to connect the
provision of a certain set of material support to a certain
terrorist attack.  That's very unlikely to occur, and that
would be such a high barrier that there would be no more
litigation in this field.
And the second reason that there's no directness
requirement is that the provision of material support to
terrorists is inherently fungible and as the Supreme Court
put it in the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, any
provision of material support to a terrorist organization
facilitates terrorist activity because no matter what form
it takes, such support frees up the resources that can be
put to violent ends.
And as Judge Weinstein put it in the Gill case, even if
a contribution is not used directly to carry out a terrorist
attack, it's still used indirectly because it refills the
terrorist coffers and -- 
THE COURT:  Don't all of the material support
cases hinge on the donor consciously providing support to a
specific organization that's going to do something that they
know or should know is a terrorist -- will result in a
terrorist act?  Don't all those cases do that?
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, the cases are all alike in
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that someone or an organization or a company gave resources
to a terrorist organization that it knew to be a terrorist
organization and knew that it was likely to carry out
terrorist attacks.  But what you don't have to show is that
they knew that it was going to be used for a specific
terrorist attack.  It's enough that you give money to the
terrorists --
THE COURT:  Fair enough.  Yeah, I agree with that.
MR. ARISOHN:  -- on one hand and then they commit
an attack on the other.  And that's all required.
And here, that's what we allege.  ISIS knew -- sorry. 
Twitter knew -- 
THE COURT:  Here, what you're alleging is that
Twitter allowed ISIS to open accounts as it allowed millions
of people around the world to open accounts, and that that
act is prohibited because it's material support.  That's
your argument.
MR. ARISOHN:  Because they knowingly provided that
support, yes.
And I don't think there's any doubt that that support
was instrumental to the rise of ISIS.  Twitter permitted
ISIS to use its social network, as you noted, to spread its
propaganda and raise funds and attract new recruits.  And
ISIS was permitted to maintain dozens of official accounts
with thousands of followers and it was through the support
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that ISIS was able to garner the resources to carry out
numerous attacks, including the November 9th attack in which
my clients were injured.
And we know specifically that ISIS was responsible for
this attack for several reasons.  
First of all, the facility where this training was
taking place, they were training officers to fight ISIS
specifically.  The attack also took place on the 10th
anniversary of ISIS bombings at luxury hotels in Amman,
Jordan.  
And then most notably, there were two claims of
responsibility by ISIS, the first by Al Batah (phonetic)
Media Foundation and the second by its Dabiq magazine.  And
the experts that we've spoken to consider these claims
highly reliable and indicative of direct involvement in
these attacks by ISIS.
THE COURT:  But you haven't alleged that Mr. Zaid
ever used Twitter, saw any of this information on Twitter. 
And I think you also said that ISIS referred to him as a
"lone wolf," which means his actions may have been inspired
by but not directed by ISIS.
So the link then to Twitter seems awfully attenuated,
even if you drill down into this level of detail.
MR. ARISOHN:  Well, first of all, the lone wolf
is -- I don't think that detracts from our allegations that
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ISIS was responsible for this attack.  
First of all, the second claim of responsibility in
Dabiq magazine, which is considered a more reliable source,
doesn't refer to him as a lone wolf.
And second of all, ISIS often provides support of one
kind of another, whether it's through arms or training or
other resources to so-called lone wolves.
Also, I should note that just in the last week or so,
we've now come across evidence from Israeli military
intelligence that the shooter in this case, Anwar Abu Zaid,
was part of an ISIS sleeper cell operating out of al-Mutah
University and that the cell helped the shooter acquire the
arms and smuggle them into the facility where the shooting
took place.
And so we're able to draw a link.  The Twitter accounts
that ISIS provided allowed ISIS to collect resources and
then ISIS was directly involved in this attack at issue.
And if we need to amend to add those allegations, we're
happy to do that but I do think that the allegations in the
complaint sufficiently set out ISIS's involvement in this
instance.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.
Mr. Waxman.
MR. WAXMAN:  Very happy and anxious to answer any
questions that your Honor has.  I won't give my stump speech
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in light of your Honor's comments.  I'll just make a couple
of comments in response to Mr. Arisohn.
First, on the section 230 ground.  The notion that the
complaint doesn't turn on -- or doesn't try to assess
liability against Twitter as a publisher is a complete
nonstarter.
As your Honor I think referenced, there isn't even a
coherent theory of causation, however attenuated.  If the
only thing that happened in this case was that Twitter
allowed ISIS supporters to open accounts, which they then
never used or used to send cat videos to each other -- and
so either the complaint requires reference to the content in
order to establish even an attenuated form of causation or
the -- in which case it falls within the heartland of
section 230. 
Now, the Barnes case -- I think as your Honor has
suggested, the Barnes case, first of all, specifically
defines publishing with reference to Prosser and Keeton and
the restatement as simply the -- any communication
intentionally or by a negligent act to a third party.  And
that certainly derives from, as the Barnes court
acknowledged and other circuits have acknowledged, the
origin of the section 230 prohibition which was -- you know,
originally arose in a defamation context. 
Second of all, with respect to the invocation of the
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alternative definition as a way to essentially extract the
direct messaging, direct messaging is covered under the
Barnes definition and the restatement in Prosser and Keeton
definition.  And logically it would have to be.  Otherwise,
every organization that provides either email or direct
messaging capability would be, ipso facto, liable
notwithstanding section 230. 
And I'm not aware of any case that has ever suggested
that section 230 wouldn't be applied to an email
communication, particularly since it is uniquely difficult
for Google, Apple, AOL, or anybody else who provides direct
messaging capability through email or otherwise, to see
what's actually being communicated.
Even if somehow under some attenuated view of causation
you could jump from -- all we're complaining about is that
you allowed ISIS supporters to open accounts and nothing
more -- could possibly form the basis for any level of
causation, however you define it.
I think it's important to understand, first of all,
what's involved in opening an account, which does involve
publishing content.  I could say I waited -- I didn't find
it necessary to actually open a Twitter account until this
weekend.  And my experience in doing it was very revealing.
When you open a -- you don't just write to them or
something and say, "Give me a private account number."  You
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have to provide content, which then, in the process of
opening the account, is published. 
I was frankly astonished to discover after I opened
this account on Saturday -- I haven't tweeted anything, I'm
not following anything, I didn't put my picture up -- I have
a whole bunch of followers.  People are following -- I'm not
leading but people are following me on Twitter because of
the content that I have posted simply by the act of opening
an account.
Even if that weren't true -- 
THE COURT:  Just because of your name?  Is that --
what is the content that you posted that people were
following?
MR. WAXMAN:  I posted, yes, my name.  I mean I
also had to post my email.  I had to provide my email
address and a telephone number.  And Twitter of course
doesn't check on whether it is actually is really my name or
really my email address or really my telephone number.
But I mean I'm feeling some pressure to say something. 
But the point is that the act of opening an account is an
act of providing content.  
And even if that weren't the case, the decision about
who to give access to the Twitter publishing medium or not,
that is whether to screen or what criteria you use, is a
consummate publishing decision. 
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If I decide I have a mimeograph machine -- I'm dating
myself.  I had a mimeograph machine --
THE COURT:  That's the last piece of technology
that I knew how to operate.
MR. WAXMAN:  I'm not sure I actually ever really
did know how to operate it.  But if I send out an
announcement saying "I have a printing press" or "I have a
mimeograph machine," and it's either available to anybody
who wants to use it or it's available if I decide to let you
use it or not, that is a consummate publishing decision,
that is who to allow access to the publishing medium or not.
That was very, very close to what was at issue in the
Fifth Circuit's decision in the Doe v. MySpace case.  And
it's actually pretty close to what was ultimately at issue
or what was being complained about in the First Circuit's
decision in the Backpage case that was decided a month or
two ago.
So section 230 absolutely immunizes Twitter's conduct
even if there were some cause of action simply for allowing
people -- knowingly allowing people to open accounts.
I mean the whole allegation of knowing is Twitter
doesn't know who is opening the account or who owns the
account except by reference to content that's posted on the
account.
I mean even the -- the complaint says well, we know
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because there were newspaper articles or some terrorism
expert or another has said so.  All of that information
comes from content that is posted by a particular user on a
Twitter account.  It's a reason why Twitter has closed
approximately 125,000 accounts.
But that decision about who to allow to have an active
account and not is a publishing decision that's immunized.
Now, the Internet Brands case, I'm very happy to hear
Mr. Arisohn say that it's very close and it's directly on
point.
In Internet Brands, as your Honor observed, the Ninth
Circuit was very careful to say that the liability attached
in that case not because Internet Brands allowed the models
to post whatever they wanted to post or even that it would
have attached if the creditors had contacted the models
through use of the website.
The liability attached because there was an independent
freestanding cause of action that in no way depended on
Internet Brands acting as a publisher or speaker.  And in
fact the Ninth Circuit, Judge Cliftons, wrote that the
failure to warn claim had, quote, nothing to do with
Internet Brands' efforts or lack thereof to edit, monitor or
remove user-generated content.  That was the distinction in
the case.
It was also the distinction in the Fair Housing Council
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v. Roommates case that was decided in an en banc opinion by
Judge Kosinski.  
And we would urge the Court to resolve this case on the
section 230 immunity grounds.  I mean we obviously would
rather win than lose, but it would be inconsistent, I want
to suggest, to resolve this on the obvious failure of
causation rather than immunity, particularly because as the
en banc Ninth Circuit has said, it is -- section 230 is an
immunity statute and it was designed to protect providers of
interactive computer services from being -- from, quote,
death by 10,000 duck bites.
And, you know, just yesterday we got notice that yet
another lawsuit was filed against Twitter, this time also
Facebook and Google, in this Court alleging that we're
liable to the relatives and victims of terrorism because
we've allowed people to open accounts.
THE COURT:  I hear what you just said, but would
you take on the material support allegation briefly --
MR. WAXMAN:  Yeah.
THE COURT:  -- and the notion that opening an
account for ISIS or any other terrorist organization makes
you responsible for providing terrorists support under the
Anti-Terrorism Act.
MR. WAXMAN:  Sure.  So I think we need to
distinguish between the criminal material support provisions
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and the separate terrorist civil remedy provision, because
the material support statutes don't require any proof of
causation and they have no intent requirement other than
knowing.
The Terrorism Civil Remedy statute does require
proximate causation and I will address why the standard is
in fact -- that by reason of requires some direct link.  But
whatever standard you have, it is a proximate causation
standard, whereas the material support statute doesn't
require that.  If the government prosecutes, they don't have
to show proximate causation and they don't have to prove
intentionality, which section 2333(a), the Terrorism Civil
Remedy provision, requires.
And therefore, for example, if you look at perhaps
their strongest case under the material support statute, the
Seventh Circuit's decision in the Boim case, Judge Posner's
decision, he contrasts what he found to state a cause of
action there with, for example, the type of services that
the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders and NGOs provide
when they provide a general service, not directly terrorism
related, in areas where they know to a certainty that they
are providing either social services or medical services to
terrorists.
And the point is that there is -- in that context, as
here, where you are providing a general purpose service that
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is offered to all -- here, it's a platform for freedom of
expression -- there is no objective intent to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population.  The intent is to provide that
service.
And so I think it's quite important to distinguish
between what the government might allege someday to be the
provision of material support on the one hand and what
actually provides a civil remedy cause of action.  And on
the whole notion of whether we are or aren't leaving aside
the Terrorism Civil Remedy, I think it's pretty revealing
that these platforms have been around for a long time and
the material support statute dates back to 1998.  
To my knowledge, no one associated with federal law
enforcement, from the Attorney General on down, has ever
suggested that Facebook or YouTube or Twitter or Apple or
any of these other sort of social media services are
providing the material support to terrorism.  
Quite the contrary, all of these services, and
certainly Twitter, has a very active ongoing relationship
with federal law enforcement.  There is a 24/7 dedicated
office at Twitter for interacting with and providing
information to law enforcement.
I would make an argument that even if you leave aside
the absence of intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population or the lack of causation, I think a good argument
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can be made that this isn't providing material support to
terrorism.  I mean providing accounts, this is a valuable
service to them -- and this goes back to the section 230 and
causation grounds.  This is a valuable service only if
they're using it.  
If the gravamen here is you let somebody open an
account and trade cat videos, that's not valuable to them. 
And so I think it's indicative of how weak a criminal direct
violation of the material support statute is the fact that
no one in and out of administrations has ever suggested that
these companies are in fact engaging in the provision of
material support.
MR. ARISOHN:  May I add something, your Honor?
THE COURT:  I'm going to give you the last word. 
I just want to make sure Mr. Waxman was finished.
Was there anything else that you -- 
MR. WAXMAN:  Well, the other thing I wanted to say
is I don't think anything turns on this because the
causation, or lack thereof, alleged in this case would fail
any standard, whether it was the substantial fact of
reasonable foreseeability or not.  
And you only have to look at the Second Circuit's
decision in the Al Rajhi case or the Rothstein case to see. 
This is far more attenuated than what was alleged in those
cases and it failed even that lower standard.
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What I would say is I'm not aware of -- the only court
that I'm aware of in a reported decision that has directly
addressed the Supreme Court's very robust interpretive
jurisprudence on by reason of, looking at it in the Sherman
Act and then the Clayton Act which took it from the Sherman
Act or RICO which took it from Clayton Act and here, the
only one that I know of that has addressed it in a terrorism
context, that is under the Terrorism Civil Remedy, is the
Second Circuit's decision in Rothstein where the court
was -- that's the only case I know of where it's actually
been -- I'm not even sure it was briefed and argued. 
But that's the only decision that has taken this on and
said, yes, this means the same thing as the Supreme Court
said that it meant in Hemi Group and Holmes and Anza.  And
the district court decisions that Mr. Arisohn is referring
to, largely in the Eastern District of New York, I'm not
aware that the Supreme Court provenance of this language was
addressed.  But if it was, they're just wrong.
THE COURT:  Mr. Arisohn.
MR. ARISOHN:  It's interesting to hear Mr. Waxman
talk about ISIS issuing cat videos, because that's something
that has actually happened and it was a phenomenon on the
internet and there was actually a very slick way that ISIS
was able to attract new recruits.
And I think it goes to the point just how fungible
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these assets and resources that are given to ISIS really
are.  You can give money to a charitable arm of a terrorist
organization, for instance, and they're going to use that to
win the hearts and minds of people and to get new members
and to further their terrorist agenda.
And, you know, just looking at the statute of the
material support provisions of the ATA here, they prohibit
providing a designated terrorist organization with any
property, tangible or intangible, or any service such as
communications equipment.
And the moment you provide a terrorist organization
with any of that kind of material support -- I don't think
there is any doubt that a powerful communications tool like 
a Twitter account constitutes material support -- given
everything that can be done with it, you have violated the
act.
And that's before they have issued even a single tweet. 
And that's before Twitter has engaged in any editing
functions because editing functions as -- the Court has set
it out as editing, monitoring, removal or issuing of content
and that's not here.  And the Ninth Circuit in Internet
Brands a few weeks ago warned that unless you're engaged in
those kinds of activities, you're not being treated as a
publisher and barring claims that do not seek to hold a
defendant liable as a publisher would stretch the CDA beyond
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its narrow language and its purpose.
And the Ninth Circuit added that we must be careful not
to exceed the scope of the immunity provided by Congress and
that Congress has not provided an all-purpose get-out-of-
jail-free card for businesses that just happen to publish on
the internet.
And that's what I think defendant is arguing here.  But
if you look at these Ninth Circuit cases, I think they
reject that contention.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you both for your
argument.
I will get an order out fairly quickly.  
I will give you leave to amend assuming that I stick
with my tentative, which I am very much inclined to do.  But
I'll give you one more shot.  I know that there has been --
this would be a second amended complaint.  And I will allow
that.
And I assume that you have the information you need so
that once I issue my order, 20 days would be sufficient.
MR. ARISOHN:  20 days from your order?
THE COURT:  Yes.
MR. ARISOHN:  I think that should be fine.
THE COURT:  Okay.  
MR. ARISOHN:  Maybe 30 just to be safe?
THE COURT:  Well, maybe the -- I'll give you
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somewhere in the 20- to 30-day range but I think you know
where I see weaknesses.  And so I'd start thinking about
that.  And I don't see any reason to have a case management
conference.  I want to -- this case will only go forward if
you're able to state a claim, and otherwise, I think you
want to get your complaint in the shape that you'd like it
for more receptive ears if mine don't work out the way that
you want them to.
All right.
MR. WAXMAN:  Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:  Thank you all.
MR. ARISOHN:  Thank you, your Honor.
(Proceedings adjourned at 2:46 p.m.)
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